Terrorism in Pakistan: Causes, Impact and the Way Forward

Military operations can break up militant groups and take back territory. They cannot, on their own, keep an area safe. Lasting security also needs effective policing, fair and timely justice, local trust and steady prevention. That is the argument of these slides, and the notes below explain it.

Why terrorism in Pakistan has resurged

What happened. The Global Terrorism Index 2026, published in March 2026 with data for 2025, ranks Pakistan as the country most affected by terrorism for the first time. It says terrorism declined from 2014 to 2019 and has risen since.

Why it matters. The causes of terrorism in Pakistan work together, so a single explanation misleads.

• Space across the border. The GTI links the rise partly to the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. The UN Monitoring Team's report of 10 August 2026 (S/2026/651, paragraph 91) says the Taliban continued their support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban publicly deny harbouring any terrorist group.
• Weak points at home. At the National Action Plan review on 22 June 2024, the government itself noted shortcomings in implementation and legal gaps that hinder prosecution (PID release, 22 June 2024).
• Local grievances. Where services, jobs and justice are weak, militants find it easier to recruit and to hide.

What response addresses it. External sanctuary and domestic weakness reinforce each other. A safe base abroad gives militants room to plan, while weak local policing lets their cells operate at home. ACLED's July 2026 overview argued that cross-border strikes alone are unlikely to work unless governance gaps and domestic security failures are also addressed.

What past operations achieved, and where gains stayed fragile

What happened. Operations in Swat and the tribal districts from 2007 to 2009 retook areas held by militants. Operation Zarb-e-Azb began in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014 (Dawn, 16 June 2014). After the Army Public School attack on 16 December 2014, Parliament approved the 20-point National Action Plan on 24 December 2014 (NACTA). Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad followed on 22 February 2017 (APP, 22 February 2020).

Why it matters. These operations removed militant control of territory, and violence fell for several years. The gains depended on what came after clearance, however. Police, courts, local administration and services had to hold cleared areas, and militants who crossed the border could regroup.

What response addresses it. Azm-e-Istehkam was approved on 22 June 2024. On 24 June 2024 the government clarified that it is not a large operation requiring displacement. It described it as a multi-agency vision to reinvigorate the Revised National Action Plan, with political, diplomatic, legal and information prongs. The GTI 2026 judges that such initiatives have had limited success so far.

Recent security challenges in Pakistan

The GTI 2026 counts 1,139 deaths and 1,045 incidents from terrorism in Pakistan in 2025, the highest death toll since 2013, with 1,595 people injured. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan account for over 74 per cent of attacks and 67 per cent of deaths. These figures count deaths caused by terrorist attacks only. They should not be added to militants killed in security operations or mixed with totals from other datasets.

Three different threats sit behind these numbers.

• TTP. Its stated aim, according to the GTI, is to overthrow the government, and it attacks mainly security forces and the state. The GTI attributes 595 attacks and 637 deaths in 2025 to the TTP. ACLED reports an attack in Karachi on 27 June 2026 by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a TTP faction. ACLED says the attack, far from the border, shows how strong the militants' domestic networks are.
• BLA. The Balochistan Liberation Army is a separatist group. The GTI says it opposes resource extraction policies and targets Chinese projects under CPEC. In March 2025 it seized the Jaffar Express in Balochistan and held 442 people hostage, according to the GTI. Its violence must not be confused with peaceful Baloch politics or with legitimate grievances.
• ISKP and sectarian cells. They seek mass casualties and exploit sectarian divisions. The UN report (paragraph 93) says ISIL-K, the UN's name for ISKP, has renewed capability for infrequent but high-profile mass-casualty attacks. On 6 February 2026, a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Islamabad killed 32 people. A group calling itself ISIL in Pakistan claimed it, but the UN report (paragraph 95) says it was likely carried out by ISIL-K.

Some links between groups are disputed. The UN report records claims by single Member States that ISIL-K and the BLA shared facilitation networks, and that BLA fighters trained alongside the TTP under Al-Qaida trainers in Afghanistan. These are reports, not established findings.

Impact of terrorism on Pakistan

Only the casualty figures above are measured. The points below explain how damage spreads, not its size.

• People and families. Each death or injury leaves families without earners, carers or children, and survivors live with trauma.
• Daily life. Attacks and security closures disrupt schools, clinics, markets and travel, so the poorest areas lose services first.
• Investment and CPEC. Businesses pay for guards and insurance, and investors delay decisions. Attacks on infrastructure and Chinese-linked projects raise the cost of CPEC.
• Public spending. Money spent on security cannot be spent on education, health or roads. That is the development opportunity cost.
• Trust and cohesion. Sectarian attacks divide communities. Heavy-handed responses can turn local people away from the state, which weakens internal security.
• Regional relations. The GTI reports open conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan from February 2026. ACLED reports Pakistani strikes after the June 2026 attacks, with the UN confirming at least 41 civilian deaths from the combined strikes. Tension of this kind hurts diplomacy, border trade and the people who depend on the crossings.

What a durable counterterrorism strategy requires

A durable counterterrorism strategy links several responses, each matched to a specific weakness.

1. External pressure. Diplomacy that reduces sanctuaries, financing and cross-border facilitation.
2. Intelligence disruption. Targeting leadership, logistics, money and online recruitment.
3. Police and counter-terrorism departments. Investigation, local intelligence and the capacity to hold cleared areas.
4. Justice. Cases that end in convictions on evidence, so that arrests are not wasted.
5. Governance and prevention. Services, rehabilitation and credible messages that reduce recruitment.

The law should target violence, not peaceful protest, political dissent or ethnic identity. Treating legitimate grievances as terrorism widens the gap that militants exploit.

How to develop this argument in a CSS Pakistan Affairs answer

1. Open with a clear thesis: operations disrupt militancy, but only institutions keep the peace.
2. Separate the TTP, the BLA and ISKP by aim, method and region.
3. Use dated evidence from named sources, and say which year each figure covers.
4. Show how sanctuary abroad and weakness at home reinforce each other.
5. Explain impact through mechanisms, not invented numbers.
6. End with a judgement on what the National Action Plan and Azm-e-Istehkam still need to deliver.

Develop your Pakistan Affairs answers

For broader Pakistan Affairs preparation, explore the Pakistan Affairs Mastery Pack, prepared by CSP Qasim Farooq. Its notes and solved analytical answers can help you connect subject knowledge with a clear, supported argument.