Pakistan Affairs · CSS 2022 · Question 7
Why did Pakistan join Western Defense Pacts? What cost it had to pay for that? Explain.
Understanding the topic
Explain why Pakistan joined SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO, before judging the price it paid. The key is the mismatch between what the Western alliances were created to do and what Pakistan expected from them.
Outline
- Introduction: one alliance, two different expectations
- Pakistan's early security and economic problems
- Reasons for joining the pacts
- Immediate benefits
- Strategic, diplomatic and domestic costs
- Overall assessment and lesson
- Conclusion
Introduction
Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955, later known as CENTO. The Western powers designed these alliances to contain communism. Pakistan, however, mainly wanted military equipment, development assistance and support against India.
The decision was understandable for a weak new state facing conflict over Kashmir, tense relations with Afghanistan and a shortage of resources. Pakistan did receive arms, training and aid. But the alliance partners never accepted India's role in Pakistan's security thinking. The resulting gap created dependence without a reliable guarantee against Pakistan's main threat.
Why Pakistan joined
Fear of India
Pakistan began with fewer industrial and military resources than India and had already fought over Kashmir. An alliance with the United States appeared to offer an external balance.
Tension with Afghanistan
Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's admission to the United Nations and raised the Pashtunistan issue. Pakistan therefore felt insecure on both borders.
Need for military equipment
The armed forces required modern aircraft, armour, communications and training. Western assistance promised quicker access than domestic production could provide.
Economic weakness
The state needed capital, food and technical support. Alliance membership opened the door to development aid and closer relations with major donors.
Cold War geography
Pakistan's location near the Soviet Union, China, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean made it useful to the Western containment system. Pakistani leaders used that value to gain attention and assistance.
Immediate benefits
American equipment and training improved Pakistan's defence capacity in the 1950s and early 1960s. Western assistance also supported irrigation, agriculture, infrastructure and public administration.
Alliance membership raised Pakistan's diplomatic profile and gave it direct access to leading Western governments. For a new and resource-poor state, these were significant gains.
The cost Pakistan paid
No protection against India
The treaties were aimed at communist aggression, not conflict with India. During the 1965 war, the United States imposed an arms embargo on both sides. Pakistan suffered more because its forces depended heavily on American equipment.
Worse relations with the Soviet Union
Pakistan allowed US intelligence facilities near Peshawar. After the 1960 U-2 incident, Moscow openly warned Pakistan and moved closer to India. Soviet diplomatic support on Kashmir became harder to obtain.
Loss of standing among non-aligned states
India gained influence by presenting itself as non-aligned, while Pakistan appeared tied to a Western bloc. This weakened Pakistan's position among many newly independent countries.
Early strain with China
SEATO was partly directed against communist expansion in Asia. Pakistan later built a close relationship with China, but its original alignment complicated that opening.
Military imbalance at home
Large flows of military aid strengthened the armed forces relative to civilian institutions. External support did not cause military rule by itself, but it reinforced the institutional imbalance that made intervention easier.
Dependence on strategic rent
The state became used to receiving assistance for its geopolitical position. When priorities in Washington changed, Pakistan faced sudden cuts and disappointment.
Failure in 1971
Neither CENTO nor SEATO prevented Pakistan's defeat and separation in 1971. The conflict did not fall within the alliances' anti-communist purpose, once again showing the limits of Pakistan's expectations.
Overall assessment
Joining the pacts was a rational attempt to address immediate weakness. The larger mistake was to treat military assistance as a security guarantee and assume that allies would adopt Pakistan's India-centred view.
A more balanced policy could have accepted economic cooperation with the West while keeping better relations with the Soviet Union, China and non-aligned states. Alliances can add to national strength, but they cannot replace domestic capacity or careful diplomacy.
Conclusion
Pakistan joined Western defence pacts to gain arms, development aid and support against regional threats. It received useful equipment and finance, but the pacts were built to contain communism, not to defend Pakistan against India. The price included Soviet hostility, weaker non-aligned credibility, dependence on Western arms and a stronger domestic military establishment. The experience offers a clear lesson: external partnerships are valuable when their purpose is explicit, but lasting security rests on balanced relations, strong institutions and a productive economy.
References
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 1954
- Baghdad Pact, 1955, United Nations Treaty Series
- US Office of the Historian, US relations with Pakistan, 1953-1961
- Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters
- Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2019: A Concise History